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MEHR ERFAHREN

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Typus
Verschleierung
Bearbeiter
Graf Isolan
Gesichtet
Yes
Untersuchte Arbeit:
Seite: 301, Zeilen: 101-110
Quelle: Garthoff 1985
Seite(n): 251, Zeilen: 18-32, 108-112
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71 See ibid., p. 1304. With regard to the Soviet side, when Kissinger first met with Dobrynin on April 14, 1969, he told him that progress on arms control, the Middle East, and economic relations would move quicker if Vietnam were out of the way, and conversely, if there were no settlement, Nixon might escalate, which would complicate any potential detente. After stating his standard line that Moscow had limited influence with Hanoi, Dobrynin promised Kissinger that they would do what they could to advance U.S. negotiating proposals and expressed a desire to improve relations with the U.S. Kissinger interpreted this to mean that the Soviets would “look away” if the U.S. escalated in Vietnam - in much the same way that Chou let him know that China also would not retaliate. See Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 266-68; Nixon, RN, p. 391; and Tad Szulc, The Illusion of Peace: Foreign Policy in the Nixon Years (New York: Viking, 1978), pp. 63-64.

And one early account that benefited from information supplied by Kissinger dates the use of this technique to Kissinger’s key April meeting with Dobrynin on Vietnam.19

Dobrynin asked if the United States was making a Vietnam settlement a precondition for progress on the Middle East, economic relations, and strategic arms limitations. Kissinger avoided making a hard and fast linkage. But he said that while the United States was prepared to talk, progress would be more rapid if Vietnam were out of the way. And conversely, if there were no settlement, Nixon might take escalatory measures that would create a "complicated situation.” Dobrynin protested that Moscow had only limited influence with the leaders in Hanoi, but promised to do what it could to forward the American negotiating proposals. He also said the Soviet leaders wished to continue negotiations for improved relations with the United States. Kissinger interpreted this as meaning the Soviets would "look away” if the United States escalated hostilities in Vietnam.20


19. Tad Szulc, The Illusion of Peace: Foreign Policy in the Nixon Years (Viking, 1978), p. 63. Szulc’s account, otherwise correct, misdates the meeting as early May rather than mid-April. He knew only that it preceded Nixon’s speech of May 14 on Vietnam.

20. See Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 266-68; Nixon, RN, p. 391; and Szulc, The Illusion of Peace, pp. 63-64.

Anmerkungen

This time not so much the words but the content has been taken over identically. The three sources named by Mec (out of numerous possibilities) are identical to the ones Garthoff cites. Garthoff is not mentioned once; nothing has been marked as a citation.

Sichter
(Graf Isolan) Schumann