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| Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 1040, Zeilen: 13-35 |
Quelle: Mukherjee Holder 2004 Seite(n): 48, 49, Zeilen: 48: l.col: 47ff - r.col: 1-5.14ff; 49: l.col: 14ff |
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| Covert networks like terrorist networks remain mingled with socially oriented networks (like families, organizations etc.) in the real world. The buzz word for covert networks is “secrecy” and hence to discover such networks (technically, to discern distinctive patterns in the activities and communications of such dark networks) can be very tricky and often misleading due to unavailability of authentic data or in some cases availability of “doctored” data. This issue has especially blown up in the recent past and after the September 11, 2001 tragedy, it has been in the limelight so much so that it is worthwhile to take a close look at the distinguishing properties of such networks. For Example:
(1) In bright networks, actors who are highly central are typically the most important ones. On the contrary, peripheral players (or “boundary spanners” as they are typically called) may be huge resources to a terrorist group although they receive very low network centrality scores. This is because they are well positioned to be innovators, since they have access to ideas and information flowing in other clusters. Similarly, in an organization, these peripheral employees are in a position to combine different ideas and knowledge into new products and services. They may be contractors or vendors who have their own network outside of the company, making them very important resources for fresh information not available inside the company (Krebs V., 2002, Hanneman, R., 2000). (2) The role of a “broker” (Krebs V., 2002) is a very powerful role in a social network as it ties two hitherto unconnected constituencies / groups together but of course, it is a single-point of failure. These broker type roles are often seen in terrorist networks. Such nodes are also referred to as “cutpoints” (Hanneman, R., 2000). 10. Hanneman, R. E., Introduction to Social Network Methods. Online Textbook Supporting Sociology 175. Riverside, CA: University of California, 2000. 13. Krebs, V.: Mapping networks of terrorist cells. Connections 24, 45–52, 2002. |
Covert networks remain mingled with socially-oriented networks (like families, organizations etc.) in the real world. The buzz word for covert networks is “secrecy” and hence to discover such networks (technically, to discern distinctive patterns in the activities and communications of such illegitimate groups) can be very tricky and often misleading due to unavailability of authentic data or in some cases availability of “doctored” data. This issue has especially blown up in the recent past and after the September 11, 2001 tragedy, it has been in the limelight so much so that it is worthwhile to take a close look at the distinguishing properties of such networks.
[...] (3) In legitimate networks, actors who are highly central are typically the most important ones. On the contrary, peripheral players (or “boundary spanners” as they are typically called) may be huge resources to a terrorist group although they receive very low network centrality scores. This is because they are well-positioned to be innovators, since they have access to ideas and information flowing in other clusters. Similarly, in an organization, these peripheral employees are in a position to combine different ideas and knowledge into new products and services. They may be contractors or vendors who have their own network outside of the company, making them very important resources for fresh information not available inside the company [5, 8]. [page 49] (9) The role of a “broker” [8] is a very powerful role in a social network as it ties two hitherto unconnected constituencies/groups together but of course, it is a single-point of failure. These broker-type roles are often seen in terrorist networks. Such nodes are also referred to as “cutpoints” [5]. [5] Robert Hanneman: Introduction to Social Network Methods, Department of Sociology, University of California, Riverside. (URL: http://faculty.ucr.edu/~hanneman /SOC157/Software/NETTEXT.PDF). [8] Valdis E. Krebs: Uncloaking Terrorist Networks (URL: http://www.firstmonday.dk/ issues/issue7_4/krebs). First Monday, volume 7, number 4, April 2002. |
The source is not given. Indeed, the number of Hanneman's undergraduate sociology course was 157 and not 175, as Nm3 claims. |
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