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| Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 342, Zeilen: 1-22 |
Quelle: Ressler_2006 Seite(n): 4, 5, 6, Zeilen: 4: 11ff; 5: 9ff; 6: 1ff |
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| [A number of academic researchers [12, 13 & 14] focus primarily on data collection] on terrorist organizations, analyzing the information through description and straightforward modeling.
Despite their strength, their work has a few key drawbacks. By dealing with open sources, these authors are limited in acquiring data. With open sources, if the author does not have information on terrorists, he or she assumes they do not exist. This can be quite problematic as the data analysis may be misleading. 3.2 Data Modelers Complex models that have been created that offer insights into theoretical terrorist networks [15] and looked at how to model the shape of a terrorist network when little information is known through predictive modeling techniques based on inherent network structures. Using a software tool known as DyNet, they looked at ways to estimate vulnerabilities and destabilize terrorist network. Carpenter, T. et al., [16] looked at some of the practical issues and algorithms for analyzing terrorist networks by discussing a number of ways to construct various social network measures when dealing with terrorist networks. Farley Jonathan David [17] also proposed a model for breaking Al Qaeda cells. A common problem for the modelers is the issue of data. Any academic work is only as good as the data, no matter the type of advanced methods used. Modelers often do not have the best data, as they have not collected individual biographies (like Sageman) and do not have access to classified data. Many of the models were created data-free or without complete data, yet do not fully consider human and data limitations [11]. 11. Ressler S., (2006). Social network analysis as an approach to combat terrorism: past, present, and future research. http://www.hsaj.org/pages/ volume2/issue2/pdfs/2.2.8.pdf 12. Krebs, Valdis E. Mapping networks of terrorist cells. Connections 24 (3) 43-52, 2002 13. Sageman, M. Understanding terrorist networks, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004 14. Rodriquez [sic], JA. The March 11th terrorist network: in its weakness lies its strength, XXV International Sunbelt Conference, Los Angeles, 2005 15. Carley, KM. Estimating vulnerabilities in large covert networks,” [sic] in proc. International Symposium on Command and Control Research and Technology San Diego, CA., 2004 16. Carpenter, T., George Karakostas, and David Shallcross. Practical issues and algorithms for analyzing terrorist networks. In proc. WMC, 2002 17. Farley D. J. Breaking Al Qaeda Cells. A mathematical analysis of counterterrorism operations (A guide for risk assessment and decision making) Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 26:399–411, 2003 |
A number of academic researchers focus primarily on data collection on terrorist organizations, analyzing the information through description and straightforward modeling. [...]
[...] Despite their many strengths, Krebs’ and Sageman’s works have a few key drawbacks. By dealing with open sources, these authors are limited in acquiring data. With open sources, if the author does not have information on terrorists, he or she assumes they do not exist. This can be quite problematic as the data analysis may be misleading. [page 5] Modelers Complex models have been created that offer insight on theoretical terrorist networks. [...] In a series of projects, Carley and her collaborators deal with a variety of terrorism-related issues. They looked at how to model the shape of a covert network when little information is known, through predictive modeling techniques based on inherent network structures.19 Using a computational tool created at CASOS known as DyNet, they looked at ways to estimate vulnerabilities and destabilize terrorist networks.20 [...] [...] In addition, in 2002, Tami Carpenter and others began to look at some of the practical issues and algorithms for analyzing terrorist networks by discussing a number of ways to construct various social network measures when dealing with covert networks.25 [page 6] A common problem for the modelers is the issue of data. Any academic work is only as good as the data, no matter the type of advanced methods used. Modelers often do not have the best data, as they have not collected individual biographies (like Sageman) and do not have access to classified data. Many of the models are created data-free or without complete data, yet do not fully consider human and data limitations. 19 Matthew Dombroski, Paul Fischbeck, and Kathleen M. Carley, “Estimating the Shape of Covert Networks,” in Proceedings of the 8th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium (Conference held at the National Defense War College, Washington D.C., 2003). 20 Kathleen Carley, “Estimating Vulnerabilities in Large Covert Networks,” in Proceedings of the 2004 International Symposium on Command and Control Research and Technology (San Diego, CA, 2004). 25 Tami Carpenter, George Karakostas, and David Shallcross, “Practical Issues and Algorithms for Analyzing Terrorist Networks” (Telcordia Technologies, 2002). |
The source is given at the end of the passage. It is only one of several sources given and the reader does not assume that it is the source of large verbatim text borrowings. Note that also the publications by Krebs, Sageman and Rodriguez are discussed in the source, however in greater detail. |
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