Angaben zur Quelle [Bearbeiten]
| Autor | James Chace |
| Titel | Acheson: the Secretary of State who created the American world |
| Ort | New York |
| Verlag | Simon & Schuster |
| Jahr | 1998 |
| URL | https://books.google.de/books?id=8Jf32GR7t3IC |
Literaturverz. |
yes |
| Fußnoten | yes |
| Fragmente | 16 |
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| By modifying the China aid bill to allow the unexpended portion to be used to continue to aid the KMT, Congress had made it impossible for Acheson to abandon support for the Nationalists and move to a realist policy of establishing relations with the communists based on their effective control of the government of China. Congress’ action was, of course, a reaction to the success of the anti-communist rhetorical campaign being waged by the administration, but it was met by the unintended consequence of Mao declaring on June 30, 1949, that China would align itself with the Soviet Union. To assure the Soviets that he was not an Asian Tito, he stated, “We must lean to one side...Sitting on the fence will not do; nor is there a third road.”23
Mao’s announcement may have been influenced by the extension of the aid bill, but for months before his statement, the Chinese communist leadership had been giving mixed signals; as Chou Enlai had stated: “It is a fond dream of the United States to split China from the Soviet Union,” but he also argued that “the Chinese Communist Party cannot afford to make enemies on both sides; no force can prevent it from having two friends at once.”24 23 Sergei Goncharov, John Lewis, Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 44. 24 Ibid., p. 49. |
[page 218]
In effect, Congress was making it impossible for Acheson to abandon support of the Chinese Nationalists and move to a realist policy of establishing relations with Beijing on the basis of who represented the effective government of China. No sooner had the aid bill been modified than Mao Zedong declared on June 30, 1949, that China would align itself with the Soviet Union. To assure the Soviets that he was not about to become an Asian Tito, he asserted, “We must lean to one side. ... Sitting on the fence will not do; nor is there a third road.”25 Mao’s decision may have been influenced by the extension of the aid bill, but [page 219] the way had been foreshadowed by Zhoe Enlai a few months earlier when he said: “It is a fond dream of the United States to split China from the Soviet Union.” However, “The Chinese Communist Party cannot afford to make enemies on both sides; no force can prevent it from having two friends at once.”26 [page 466] 25. Quoted in Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 44. [page 467] 26. Quoted in Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners, p. 49. |
Though here the line of argument (including citations) and a lot of the wording has been taken identically from Chace (1998), these passages have not been marked as a citation, and the source has not been given. Also cp. Kaczynski et al. (2017). |
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| Although diplomatic relations with the United States might not be possible until Washington broke all supportive ties with the Nationalists, the communists wanted to trade with America, which, in turn, might accelerate the recognition process. Ten days after Mao’s speech, he dispatched Chen Mingshu to explain his thinking to Ambassador Stuart. In mid-July 1949, Chen told Stuart that Mao’s declaration was geared for domestic consumption and that the CCP still hoped for formal diplomatic relations between the United States and a Chinese communist regime.25
Trade was the key issue. The administration saw Sino-American trade as a way to pry the Chinese communists from Moscow’s embrace; Mao and Chou saw it as a hedge against too close an alignment with Stalin. (Simultaneously, Stalin, alarmed at the signing of the NATO treaty, perceived China as an increasingly valuable asset in the rapidly developing cold war.) 25 Christensen, p. 91. |
[page 219]
Although the Chinese Communists might not be able to have close relations with the United States until Washington finally broke with Chiang's Nationalists, they could at least trade with America, and this might lead to eventual diplomatic ties. In fact, ten days after Mao’s "lean to one side" statement, Mao dispatched Chen Mingshu, described as a "fellow traveler of the Communists" from the Nationalists, to explain his thinking to the American ambassador in Nanjing. In mid-July 1949 Chen told Ambassador Stuart that Mao’s declaration was designed "for his own party." The Chinese Communistss still hoped for formal diplomatic relations between the United States and a Chinese communist regime.27 [...] The Americans saw Sino-American trade as a means of weaning away the Chinese Communists from Moscow’s embrace; Mao and Zhou saw it as a hedge against too close an alignment with Stalin. At the same time, Stalin, alarmed at the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949, perceived China as an increasingly valuable asset in the Cold War. [page 467] 27. See Christensen, Useful Adversaries, pp. 91-92. |
Though here the wording has been taken from Chace (1998) and in most places is identical, these passages have not been marked as a citation, and the source has not been given. Also cp. Kaczynski et al. (2017). |
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| [3.] Mec/Fragment 105 12 - Diskussion Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2017-06-22 16:03:42 Graf Isolan | Chace 1998, Fragment, Gesichtet, Mec, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop, Verschleierung |
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| In the Letter, Acheson was determined to demonstrate that the failures of the Nationalist government “do not stem from an inadequacy of aid.” Emphasizing that “history has proved again and again that a regime without faith in itself and an army without morale cannot survive the test of battle,” the Letter reiterated that “nothing the United States did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities could have changed the results.”37
37 China White Paper, August 1949, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1967), pp. xiv-xvi. |
[page 219]
In the Letter, signed by the secretary of state, Acheson was determined to demonstrate that the failures of the Nationalist government “do not stem from an inadequacy of American aid.” Pointing out that “history has proved again and again that a regime without faith in itself and an army without morale cannot survive the test of battle,” the Letter reiterated that “nothing the United States did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities could have changed the results.”29 [page 467] 29. The White Paper, pp. xiv-xvi. |
The wording in-between citations has also been taken identically from Chace (1998). Chace is not even mentioned here. Also cp. Kaczynski et al. (2017). |
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| The Letter was essentially a political document meant to portray the Chinese communists as chumps of Moscow; it stated that the CCP leaders “have publicly announced their subservience to a foreign power, Russia,” though, according to John Melby, who drafted the White Paper, Acheson did not agree with this assessment but approved the language to appease the China bloc.38 But by asserting Beijing’s submissiveness to Moscow, he made it much more difficult to pursue his preferred policy of eventual recognition, even if Mao were to conquer Taiwan and eliminate all domestic opposition. Even at this point, Acheson was still searching for a way to keep apart Moscow and Beijing. He apparently believed that the CCP would eventually have to choose between the interests of its own people and those of the Soviet Union. By accusing Mao of submitting to Stalin, he hoped to inspire the Chinese to “throw off the foreign yoke.”39
The White Paper aroused widespread fury. Journalist Walter Lippmann, who attacked the language about China’s subservience to the Soviet Union, believed that the United States was doing too much on behalf of a hopeless cause. The China bloc was outraged because they believed the United States was doing too little. General Patrick Hurley called the White Paper “a smooth alibi for the pro-communists in the State Department who had engineered the overthrow of our ally, the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China.”40 38 Ibid., p. xvi. 39 Ibid. 40 Cited in Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China: 1941-50 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), p. 509. |
[page 219]
The Letter was essentially a political document that portrayed the Chinese [page 220] communists as tools of Moscow. It stated that the Chinese Communist leaders “have publicly announced their subservience to a foreign power, Russia.”30 This was a position that Acheson did not hold, according to John Melby, a key adviser on China affairs for General Marshall, who had written the draft of the White Paper.31 He approved this language in order to appease the China bloc and because he thought it would be little noted. [...] By asserting Beijing’s submissiveness to Moscow, he made it much more difficult to pursue a policy of recognition, even should Mao eventually conquer Taiwan and eliminate all domestic opposition. In fact, Acheson was still searching for a way to separate Beijing from Moscow. He seems to have believed that the China's Communist leaders would eventually have to choose between the interests of their own people and those of Moscow. By accusing Mao of kowtowing to Stalin, he hoped to spur on the Chinese to “throw off the foreign yoke.”32 Not only did the White Paper arouse the ire of Walter Lippmann, who attacked the language about China’s subservience to the Soviet Union and also believed America had been doing too much in a loosing cause, it also enraged the China bloc, which believed America had done too little. General Hurley called the White Paper “a smooth alibi for the pro-Communists in the State Department who had engineered the overthrow of our ally, the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China.”33 [page 467] 31. In his oral history, Melby recalls that Acheson “didn’t believe a word of that Letter of Transmittal. The Letter of Transmittal was one of those products of a committee. ... Still, the letter was all anyone ever read, and Acheson had signed it thinking that it didn’t make any difference. ... That was his mistake, because it was what people latched on to.” Melby citation from Christensen, Useful Adversaries, p. 96, fn. 79. Christensen also reveals in the same footnote that the China scholar Allen Whiting told him that Philip Jessup claimed authorship of the letter of transmittal in a conversation he had with Whiting. 32. The White Paper, p. xvi. 33. Cited in Tsou, America's Failure in China, p. 509. |
"Ibid" in 38 and 39 refers to "China White Paper, August 1949, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1967), pp. xiv-xvi." Footnote 38 in this form does not make much sense, since it does not tell, where Mec takes the information from, concerning John Melby's statement. Though here the wording has been taken from Chace (1998) and in most places is identical, these passages have not been marked as a citation, and the source has not been given. Also cp. Kaczynski et al. (2017). |
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| Republican Senators such as Knowland, Styles Bridges, and Kenneth Wherry, along with Democrat Pat McCarran assailed the White Paper as “a 1054 page whitewash of a wishful, do-nothing policy which has succeeded only in placing Asia in danger of Soviet conquest.”41
[...] Losing China Diplomatic recognition of the Chinese communist government, which Mao officially declared on October 1, 1949, was a necessity in Acheson’s view, despite his public denials that he was considering such an option. 41 Ibid. |
[page 220]
Republican senators like Knowland, Styles Bridges of New Hampshire, and Kenneth Wherry of Nebraska, along with Democrat Pat McCarran of Nevada, assailed the White Paper as “a 1,054-page whitewash of a wishful, do-nothing policy which has succeeded only in placing Asia in danger of Soviet conquest.”34 Diplomatic recognition of the Communist Chinese government, which Mao officially proclaimed as the government of China on October 1, 1949, was an absolute necessity in Acheson’s view. [page 467] 34. Ibid.; Senator Wherry characterization in Isaacson and Thomas, The Wise Men, p. 475. |
Continued from the previous page. Still nothing has been marked as a citation from Chace (1998) though it is in most places identical. |
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| While Walton Butterworth, the assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, argued for a UN plebiscite that would allow Taiwan’s population to vote for either mainland control or some form of UN trusteeship, pending independence, and George Kennan argued for ridding the island of the Nationalists but retaining it as a strategic asset to the United States, Acheson recommended that the United States abandon any effort to prevent the island from falling to the communists.46
But faced with domestic pressure to support Taiwan from any threat by the Chinese communists, Acheson had to back down, at least in theory. When Truman signed a Mutual Defense Act that included an appropriation of $75 million for “the general area of China,” Chiang’s supporters grew hopeful, but they soon discovered [that the president, on Acheson’s counsel, did not intend to use the money to aid the Nationalist regime on Taiwan.47] 46 Dorothy Borg and Waldo Heinrich, eds., Uncertain Years: Chinese-American Relations, 1947-50 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), pp. 27-28; also memorandum from Livingston Merchant to the director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth), Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Volume IX (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Office, 1972-1976, May 24, 1949), pp. 337-41. [47 Acheson, p. 350.] |
[page 221]
In the State Department Walton Butterworth, the assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs, and George Kennan offered different approaches, designed to prevent the island from coming under Mao’s control. Butterworth suggested a United Nations plebiscite that would allow Taiwan’s population to vote for either mainland control or some form of UN trusteeship, pending independence. George Kennan proposed a drastic scheme for ridding the island of the Nationalist soldiers but retaining it as strategically valuable to the United States. [...] Acheson rejected these proposals and recommended that the United States abandon any effort to prevent the island from falling to the Communists.36 In August 1949, in a meeting with members of the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also agreed that military measures would be unwise.37 Still, pressures mounted on Acheson to support Taiwan from any attack from the mainland Communists. [...] When Truman signed a Mutual Defense Act that included an appropriation of $75 million for the “general area of China,” Chiang’s supporters grew hopeful. But they soon discovered that Truman, on Acheson’s advice, did not intend to use the money to aid the Nationalist regime on Taiwan. [page 467] 36. In the spring of 1949 Acheson had sent State Department official Livingston Merchant to Taiwan to investigate conditions on the island. He came back with the recommendation that America do nothing to prevent the island from falling to the Communists. (See memorandum from Livingston T. Merchant to the director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs [Butterworth], FRUS, 1949, vol. IX, May 24, 1949, pp. 337-341.) 37. Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 350. |
Nothing has been marked as a citation. Chace (1998) is not even mentioned. Also cp. Kaczynski et al. (2017). |
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| [When Truman signed a Mutual Defense Act that included an appropriation of $75 million for “the general area of China,” Chiang’s supporters grew hopeful, but they soon discovered] that the president, on Acheson’s counsel, did not intend to use the money to aid the Nationalist regime on Taiwan.47 In his end-of-the-year memorandum to the president, he declared that the United States should not subsidize attacks by the Nationalists on Mao's government, which “would soon be widely recognized.”48
47 Acheson, p. 350. 48 Christensen, p. 108. |
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[...] 37 When Truman signed a Mutual Defense Act that included an appropriation of $75 million for the “general area of China,” Chiang’s supporters grew hopeful. But they soon discovered that Truman, on Acheson’s advice, did not intend to use the money to aid the Nationalist regime on Taiwan. [...] In his end- of-the-year memorandum to the president he further declared that America should not subsidize attacks by the Nationalists on Mao’s government, which “would soon be widely recognized.”39 [page 467] 37. Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 350. [...] 39. Quoted in Christensen, Useful Adversaries, p. 108. |
Continued from previous pages. Nothing has been marked as a citation. Chace (1998) is not even mentioned. Also cp. Kaczynski et al. (2017). |
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| On January 10, Acheson testified in executive session before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He stated that he saw no reason to move with dispatch on the matter of recognizing Mao’s government, saying that he wanted to see how the CCP would behave toward Americans in China and how it would handle the foreign debts incurred by the Nationalist government, but he warned the senators not to get “this thing mixed up with approval or disapproval.” Above all, “We should not [use] military forces of the United States to take, secure, or defend Formosa.”60
60 Acheson testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, January 10, 1950, 81st Congress, Historical Series: Reviews of the World Situation, 1949-50 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), pp. 131-134, 137, 149. |
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On January 10, 1950, Acheson testified in executive session before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. As far as recognition of Mao’s government was concerned, he saw no reason to move too swiftly at this time. He wanted to see how the Chinese Communists would behave toward Americans in China, and their attitude toward the foreign debts of the Nationalist government, but he warned the senators not to get “this thing mixed up with approval or disapproval.” Above all, “We should not [use] military forces of the United States to take, secure, or defend Formosa.”44 [page 467] 44. Acheson testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Eighty-first Congress, Historical Series: Reviews of the World Situation, 1949-1950 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), January 10, 1950, pp. 131-134, 137, 149. |
Citation and reference and the wording in-between is exactly as in Chace (1998), but Chace is not even mentioned once. Also cp. Kaczynski et al. (2017). |
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| Two days later, he delivered his famous speech at the National Press Club, during which he reminded his audience that no one said “the Nationalist government fell because it was confronted by overwhelming military force which it could not resist;” on the contrary, Chiang’s “support in the country had melted away.” He warned Americans against “the folly of ill-conceived adventures on our part,” which could “deflect from the Russians to ourselves the righteous anger, and the wrath, and the hatred of the Chinese which must develop. It would be folly to deflect it to ourselves.”
He went on to describe the military security of the Pacific area, pointing out that the American “defense perimeter” ran from the Aleutian Islands to Japan, then on to Okinawa and the Philippines. Foreshadowing Nixon’s later policy of Vietnamization, he stated that in South Korea, “initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations...” He did emphasize, however, that the United States bore “a direct responsibility” for Korea and Japan.61 61 Dean Acheson, “Relations of the Peoples of the United States and the Peoples of Asia: We Can Only Help Where We Are Wanted,” Vital Speeches of the Day, (Washington, D.C., January 12, 1950). |
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Two days later Acheson delivered an important address on Far Eastern policy to the National Press Club in Washington. [...] [...] In the main, Acheson was repeating for a larger public what he had been saying privately to members of Congress. He reminded his audience that nobody said “the Nationalist Government fell because it was confronted by overwhelming military force which it could not resist”; on the contrary, Chiang’s “support in the country has melted away.” He warned Americans against “the folly of ill- conceived adventures on our part,” which could “deflect from the Russians to ourselves the righteous anger, and the wrath, and the hatred of the Chinese which must develop. It would be folly to deflect it to ourselves.”45 Acheson did, however, describe the military security of the Pacific area, pointing out that the American “defensive perimeter” ran from the Aleutian Islands to Japan, then on to Okinawa and the Philippine Islands. In South Korea, on the other hand, “initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations....” Acheson emphasized, however, that the United States bore “a direct responsibility” for Korea, as it did for Japan. [page 467] 45. Dean Acheson, “Relations of the Peoples of the United States and the Peoples of Asia: We Can Only Help Where We Are Wanted,” Vital Speeches of the Day, January 12, 1950. |
Unmarked take-over continued from previous page. Citations and reference and the wording in-between is exactly as in Chace (1998), but Chace is not even mentioned once. Also cp. Kaczynski et al. (2017). |
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| The Diplomatic Door Slams Shut
On January 14, 1950, Mao’s government seized American consular property in Shanghai and Beijing, which led to the withdrawal of all American personnel from the Chinese mainland that spring. A month later, Moscow and Beijing signed a defense pact, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship. |
On January 14, 1950, Mao’s government seized American consular property in Shanghai and Beijing, which led to the withdrawal of all American personnel from the Chinese mainland that spring. A month later Moscow and Beijing signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, a defense pact. |
Nothing has been marked as a citation. Also cp. Kaczynski et al. (2017). |
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| On March 29, 1950, Acheson once again testified in executive session before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. [...] “If the devil himself runs China, if he is an independent devil, that is infinitely better than if he is a stooge of Moscow.” Despite the Sino-Soviet agreement signed in February, “the Chinese, inevitably, we believe, will come into conflict with Moscow.”69
Further, Acheson told the senators that he was particularly wary of Chiang’s adventurism: the risk was that Chiang, who was running a war against the mainland by “bombing Nanking and other cities,” would drag the United States into war with mainland China. According to Acheson, Chiang “believed that World War III is absolutely inevitable,” in which case “the United States will have to go back and conquer China, and he will come riding in on our coat tails.” As far as Acheson was [concerned, Chiang was tempting Mao to invade Taiwan: “The communists would be criminally crazy if they did not put an end to (Chiang’s hold on the island) just as soon as possible.”70] 69 Testimony, Dean Acheson in executive session, U.S. Congress, U .S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 81st Congress, Historical Series, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 29 , 1950), p. 273. [70 Ibid., pp. 273-276.] |
[page 224]
On March 29,1950, Acheson once again testified in executive session before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. “If the devil himself runs China,” he said, “if he is an independent devil, that is infinitely better than if he is a stooge of Moscow, or China comes under Russia.” Despite the Sino-Soviet agreement signed in February, “the Chinese, inevitably, we believe, will come into conflict with Moscow.”52 Acheson also told the senators that he was especially wary of Chiang Kai-shek’s adventurism, the risk that Chiang, who was running a war against the mainland by “bombing Nanking and other cities,” would drag the United States into conflict with China proper. According to Acheson, Chiang “believed World War III is absolutely inevitable,” in which case “the United States will have to go back and conquer China, and he will come riding in on our coat tails.” As far as Acheson was concerned, Chiang was actually inviting Mao to invade Taiwan. “The Communists would be criminally crazy,” he advised the senators, “if they did not put an end to [Chiang’s island bastion] just as soon as possible.”53 [page 468] 52. Acheson testimony in executive session before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Eighty-first Congress, Historical Series, March 29, 1950, p. 273. 53. Acheson testimony in executive session, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, March 29, 1950, pp. 273-276. |
Citations and reference and the wording in-between is exactly as in Chace (1998), but Chace is not even mentioned once. Also cp. Kaczynski et al. (2017). |
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| [As far as Acheson was] concerned, Chiang was tempting Mao to invade Taiwan: “The communists would be criminally crazy if they did not put an end to (Chiang’s hold on the island) just as soon as possible.”70
Had this actually happened, Acheson believed that he could have overcome domestic opposition to recognizing the communist regime. Though secretly the administration hoped that Mao would become an Asian Tito, Acheson was not clear in his public statements as to whether the U.S. could encourage that development or to whether the Chinese people should be encouraged to overthrow the communists by portraying them as puppets of Moscow. Further, it seemed unlikely that an alternative policy of recognizing the communist regime on the mainland would have been acceptable to the Congress and the American people. [69 Testimony, Dean Acheson in executive session, U.S. Congress, U .S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 81st Congress, Historical Series, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 29 , 1950), p. 273.] 70 Ibid., pp. 273-276. |
[page 224]
As far as Acheson was concerned, Chiang was actually inviting Mao to invade Taiwan. “The Communists would be criminally crazy,” he advised the senators, “if they did not put an end to [Chiang’s island bastion] just as soon as possible.”53 Had this happened, Acheson believed that he could have overcome opposition to recognizing Communist China. [...] On the other hand, he was never clear on whether he wanted to persuade Mao to become an Asian Tito or to encourage the Chinese people to overthrow the Communists by depicting them as Moscow’s puppets. Nor is it evident that an alternative policy of recognizing mainland China as the legitimate government of China would have been acceptable to Congress. [page 468] 52. Acheson testimony in executive session before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Eighty-first Congress, Historical Series, March 29, 1950, p. 273. 53. Acheson testimony in executive session, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, March 29, 1950, pp. 273-276. |
Citations and reference and the wording in-between is as in Chace (1998). The last paragraph follows Chace thought for thought. Chace is not even mentioned once. Also cp. Kaczynski et al. (2017). |
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| Further, the struggle between the United States and Soviet Union was depicted in terms of good versus evil, and even the cautionary notes that were sounded against those who were urging preventive war were obscured by the assertion that “the cold war is in fact a real war in which the survival of the free world is at stake.”74 Containment without military power to back it up would be “no more than a policy of bluff.” Armed with grave concerns about expanding Soviet power, the authors of NSC 68, principally Paul Nitze, were determined to increase not only U.S. conventional forces to contain and rollback a possible Soviet attack, but [also American atomic weapons as a deterrent against any presumed Soviet use of such weaponry.]
74 For the full text of NSC 68, see Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Volume I (Washington, D.C.:U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972-1976), pp. 237-290. |
[page 275]
The struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union was depicted in Manichaean terms—good versus evil—and even the cautionary notes that were sounded against those who were urging preventive war were obscured by the assertion that “the cold war is in fact a real war in which the survival of the free world is at stake.”19 [...] But containment without military power to back it up would be “no more than a policy of bluff.” [page 276] Given these fears and force projections, the authors of NSC 68 were determined to increase not only U.S. conventional forces to contain a possible Soviet attack, but also American atomic weapons as a deterrent against any presumed Soviet use of such weaponry. [page 473] 19. All citations from NSC 68 are found in FRUS, 1950, vol. I, pp. 237-290. |
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| Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 123, Zeilen: 1 ff. |
Quelle: Chace 1998 Seite(n): 276, Zeilen: 8 ff. |
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| [Armed with grave concerns about expanding Soviet power, the authors of NSC 68, principally Paul Nitze, were determined to increase not only U.S. conventional forces to contain and rollback a possible Soviet attack, but] also American atomic weapons as a deterrent against any presumed Soviet use of such weaponry. They argued strongly for increasing military spending, saying that the American economy could provide “enormous resources for purposes other than civilian consumption.” Echoing this line, former Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett read NSC 68 and told the drafting committee that “there was practically nothing that the country could not do if it wanted to do it.”75
Expanding means to meet larger ends seemed both feasible and necessary. Evoking Alexander Hamilton, who wrote in the Federalist that “the means employed must be proportioned to the extent of the mischief,” the authors of NSC 68 found in Hamilton’s doctrine the answer to the question of how a nation that believed itself scrupulous about the means it would use to defend itself would be able to stand up against a power like the Soviet Union, unburdened by such scruples. Beyond doing whatever was necessary to survive as a nation, the United States would use the means proportional to the extent of the mischief. This would require a broad range of military responses if America’s aim were “frustrating the Kremlin’s design.” But it also meant that the political will to support and sustain such an effort would need to be summoned. The heightened language allowed the administration to make the case as clearly and persuasively as possible. Although the point of NSC 68 was to call for greater expenditures to defend U.S. interests, the authors only outlined the threat and not the interests involved. Interests could therefore expand or contract according to Washington’s evaluation of the threat. 75 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p. 94. |
Given these fears and force projections, the authors of NSC 68 were determined to increase not only U.S. conventional forces to contain a possible Soviet attack, but also American atomic weapons as a deterrent against any presumed Soviet use of such weaponry. The paper argued that the American economy had the ability to provide "enormous resources for purposes other than civilian consumption while simultaneously providing a higher standard of living.”
[...] When former under secretary of state Robert Lovett read the draft of NSC 68, the Wall Street banker told the drafting committee that “there was practically nothing that the country could not do if it wanted to do it.”22 Expanding means to meet larger ends seemed both feasible and desirable, although the ends as such were never spelled out. Evoking Alexander Hamilton, who wrote in the Federalist that “the means employed must be proportioned to the extent of the mischief,” Nitze and his colleagues found in Hamilton’s doctrine the answer to the question of how a nation that believed itself scrupulous about the means it would use to defend itself would be able to stand up against a power like the Soviet Union, which possessed no such scruples. Beyond doing whatever was necessary to survive as a nation, the United States would employ the means proportional to the extent of the mischief. This would require a broad range of military responses if America’s aim was “frustrating the Kremlin design.” But it also meant that the U.S. military buildup should be defensive in nature, that it should not imply a preventive war, and that the United States should not become too reliant on atomic weapons to deter Soviet aggression. A war of annihilation was ruled out. Nowhere does NSC 68 discuss in any geographical detail where American interests conflicted with Russia’s. Although the point of NSC 68 was to call for greater expenditures to defend existing U.S. interests, the authors of the document did not define those interests, only the threat. Interests could therefore expand or contract according to Washington’s evaluation of that threat. [page 473] 22. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, “NSC-68 and the Korean War,” p . 94. |
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| Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 124, Zeilen: 2 ff. |
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| Acheson himself had maintained that to gain support for a major policy, “qualification must give way to simplicity of statement, nicety and nuance to bluntness, almost brutality, in carrying home a point.”76 And to add greater force to his argument, he stated that “....points to be understandable had to be clear. If we made our points clearer than truth, we did not differ from other educators and could hardly do otherwise.”77
As in the case of the Truman Doctrine, the language of NSC 68 was helpful in giving Truman the support that would have been much harder to achieve had the arguments been more nuanced. The price paid, however, was to convince senior officials that the United States must prepare to counter the Soviet Union militarily not only along the Iron Curtain, but, if necessary, in far more distant areas. This was not Acheson’s intention. He told a Senate hearing in May that the United States had to be wary not to take on more than it could afford: “I think we have to start out with the realization that the main center of our activity at present has to be in Europe. We cannot scatter our shots equally all over the world. We just haven’t got the shots for that.”78 76 Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 373. 77 Ibid., p. 375. 78 Testimony, by Dean Acheson in executive session, U.S. Congress, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Historical Series: Reviews of the World Situation, 1949-1959 (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 292. |
Acheson maintained that to gain support for a major policy, “qualification must give way to simplicity of statement, nicety and nuance to bluntness, almost brutality, in carrying home a point.” In approving NSC 68, Acheson was repeating the process he had used to gain support from senior senators for the Truman Doctrine. He was allowing the authors to make the points “clearer than truth.”28
As in the case of the Truman Doctrine, the language used may well have given him the support that would have been much harder to achieve had he been more nuanced. The price paid, however, was to convince the senior officials that the United States must prepare to counter the Soviet Union militarily not only along the Iron Curtain, but, if necessary, in far more distant areas. This was not his intention. Acheson told a Senate hearing in May that the United States had to be wary not to take on more than it could afford. “I think we have to start out with the realization that the main center of our activity at present has to be in Europe,” Acheson declared. “We cannot scatter our shots equally all over the world. We just haven’t got the shots for that.”29 [page 473] 28. Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 374-376. 29. Acheson testimony, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, executive session, Historical Section, Reviews of the World Situation, 1949-1950, p. 292. |
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| Even, the rhetoric of NSC 68, however, was not enough to garner the support Acheson required for the military buildup. Only a crisis would produce that, and NSC 68 was shelved until the outbreak of the Korean war. | Even the rhetoric of NSC 68 was not enough to garner the support Acheson required for the military buildup he believed America needed. Only a crisis would produce that. |
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