Assessing the Impact of XML/EDI with Real Option Valuation

von Dr. Shermin Voshmgir

vorherige Seite | zur Übersichtsseite | folgende Seite

Statistik und Sichtungsnachweis dieser Seite findet sich am Artikelende

[1.] Svr/Fragment 039 01 - Diskussion
Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2020-05-21 15:57:44 [[Benutzer:|]]
BauernOpfer, Fragment, Gesichtet, Ritz 1995, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop, Svr

Typus
BauernOpfer
Bearbeiter
SleepyHollow02
Gesichtet
Yes.png
Untersuchte Arbeit:
Seite: 39, Zeilen: 1-3, 5-32
Quelle: Ritz 1995
Seite(n): 53, 54, Zeilen: 53: 3 ff.; 54: 1 ff.
At an organization level, internal business processes may have to be re-shaped in order to be able to interface with trading partners and to reap the full benefits from electronic trading. [Also, retraining of employees are affected by innovations. (Ritz 1995: 52-53).]

Last but not least, opportunity costs also have to be mentioned in this context. Those arise from the uncertainties associated with the collective action of establishing and EDI network. Should EDI initiative fail for the lack of attracting sufficient participants, investments in the joint infrastructure will be al least partly be sunk costs. Furthermore the giving up of established forms of trade data exchange when joining an EDI network also yields opportunity costs from the perspective of an individual participant (Ritz 1995: 53).

Risk of Sunk Costs: A very large proportion of the investments in the joint infrastructure outlined above have to be made up-front. Coordination costs arising during the process of determining the network's future characteristics and planning it's implementation. Hard- and software systems have to be acquired and installed before trial operations may begin. Intermediary organizations need to be founded and incorporated before the diffusion process starts. Once the network infrastructure is established, the marginal cost of adding trading partners is comparably low from an initiator's perspective. The reason is that the infrastructure represents fixed costs. Increasing trading volume augments total costs only slightly. As a consequence, unit cost per transaction falls, leading to significant cost based economics of scale. The danger of competing EDI initiatives superseding a focal network is very high at that early stage, and so are the related opportunity costs. The reason is the inherent uncertainty of whether a sufficiently large number of network participants will be attracted to guarantee the success of the collective action. As the number of network participants increases, i.e. as the point of critical mass is being approached, the risk of failure decreases. This leads to a stabilization of expectations among community members, which in turn attracts additional participants and enables the self-sustained growth of an EDI network. For the same set of reasons, the opportunity cost of an individual organization, that has to give up and established platform of trading partner communication, are high at that early stage (Ritz 1995:53-54).


Ritz, D. 1995, The start-up of an EDI Network: A comparative case study for the air cargo industry, Dissertation, Hochschule für Wissenschaft-, Recht- u. Sozialwissenschften [sic] St. Gallen.

At an organizational level, internal business processes may have to be re-shaped in order to be able to interface with trading partners and to reap the full benefits from electronic trading. [...]

Last but not least, opportunity costs also have to be mentioned in this context. Those arise from the uncertainties associated with the collective action of establishing an EDI network. Should an EDI initiative fail for the lack of attracting sufficient participants, either because the design was not accepted by community members, or because it was superseded by a rivalling solution, investments in the joint infrastructure will at least partly be in vain. Furthermore, the giving up of established forms of trade data exchange when joining an EDI network also yields opportunity costs from the perspective of an individual participant (Monse and Reimers 1993).

Arising costs in a temporal perspective

A very large proportion of the investments in the joint infrastructure outlined above have to be made up-front. Coordination costs arise during the process of determining the network's future characteristics and planning its implementation; hard- and software systems have to be acquired and installed before trial operations may begin; intermediary organizations need to be founded and incorporated before the diffusion process starts, etc. Once the network infrastructure is established, however, the marginal cost of adding trading partners is comparably low from an initiator's perspective. The reason is that the infrastructure represents fixed costs. Increasing transaction volume augments total costs only slightly. As a consequence, unit cost per transaction falls, leading to significant cost-based economies of scale (see also Sheldon 1993).

The danger of competing EDI initiatives superseding a focal network is very high at that early stage, and so are the related opportunity costs. The reason is the inherent uncertainty of whether a sufficiently large number of network participants will be attracted to guarantee the success of the collective action. As the number of network

[page 54]

participants increases, i.e. as the point of critical mass is being approached, the risk of failure decreases. This leads to a stabilization of expectations among community members, which in turn attracts additional participants and enables the self-sustained growth of an EDI network (Schneider 1993).21 For the same set of reasons the opportunity costs of an individual organization, which has to give up an established pattern of trading partner communication, are high at that early stage, too.


Monse, K. and Reimers, K. (1993) The development of electronic data interchange networks from an institutional perspective, Paper presented at the EDI/IONS PICT-COST Workshop, Edinburgh, April 15-16, 1993.

Schneider, V. (1993) Networks and games in large technical systems. The case of Videotex, in: Scharpf, F.W. (ed.) Games in hierarchies and networks. Analytical and empirical approaches to the study of governance institutions, Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 1993, pp. 251-286.

Sheldon, P. (1993) Destination information systems, in: Journal of Tourism Research, Vol. 20, 1993, pp. 633-649.

Anmerkungen

The source is given twice, but it is not made clear that the text is so closely and extensively copied.

Sichter
(SleepyHollow02) Schumann



vorherige Seite | zur Übersichtsseite | folgende Seite
Letzte Bearbeitung dieser Seite: durch Benutzer:Schumann, Zeitstempel: 20200125211455
Nutzung von Community-Inhalten gemäß CC-BY-SA, sofern nicht anders angegeben.
… weitere Daten zur Seite „Svr/039
SleepyHollow02 +
(SleepyHollow02) Schumann +