Assessing the Impact of XML/EDI with Real Option Valuation

von Dr. Shermin Voshmgir

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[1.] Svr/Fragment 103 18 - Diskussion
Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2020-05-30 21:30:13 [[Benutzer:|]]
BauernOpfer, Fragment, Gesichtet, Reinganum 1981, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop, Svr

Typus
BauernOpfer
Bearbeiter
SleepyHollow02
Gesichtet
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Untersuchte Arbeit:
Seite: 103, Zeilen: 18-28
Quelle: Reinganum 1981
Seite(n): 395, Zeilen: 21 ff., 31 ff.
These results are based on a previous paper, Reinganum (1981a), where she assumes that firms are operating at Nash Equilibrium1 output levels, generating a market price and profit allocations. When a cost-reducing innovation is announced, each firm must determine when (if ever) to adopt it, based in part upon the behavior of the rival firm. If either firm adopts before the other, it can expect to make substantial profits on the expense of the other firm. On the other hand the discounted sum of purchase price and adjustment costs may decline with the lengthening of the adjustment period as various quasi-fixed factors become more easily variable. Reinganum analyzes the case of identical firms, and non-identical firms. She shows that there exist two asymmetric1 Nash equilibria in pure strategies. In both cases, at Nash equilibrium, one firm will adopt the innovation at [a relatively early date, the other relatively later.]

1 A Nash equilibrium is a situation in which each firm is doing the best it can given the behaviour of its rivals (applied to Oligopoly and Duoploy situations, where interdependece of market price and output levels between market players is big).


Reinganum, J. F. 1981a, “On the Diffusion of New Technology: A game Theoretic apprach”, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 48, 1981, pp. 395 – 405.

Nash equilibrium output levels, generating a market price (given demand) and profit allocations. When a cost-reducing innovation is announced, each firm must determine when (if ever) to adopt it, based in part upon the discounted cost of implementing the new technology, and in part upon the behavior of the rival firm. If either firm adopts before the other, it can expect to make substantial profits at the expense of the other firm. On the other hand, the discounted sum of purchase price and adjustment costs may decline with the lengthening of the adjustment period as various quasi-fixed factors become more easily variable. [...] In Section 3 it is shown that there exist two asymmetric Nash equilibria in pure strategies. That is, at a Nash equilibrium, one firm will adopt the innovation at a relatively early date, the other relatively later. Thus even in the case of identical firms and complete certainty, there is a "diffusion" of innovation over time.
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