Assessing the Impact of XML/EDI with Real Option Valuation

von Dr. Shermin Voshmgir

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[1.] Svr/Fragment 104 01 - Diskussion
Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2020-05-30 21:29:32 [[Benutzer:|]]
BauernOpfer, Fragment, Gesichtet, Reinganum 1981, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop, Svr

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Untersuchte Arbeit:
Seite: 104, Zeilen: 1-2
Quelle: Reinganum 1981
Seite(n): 395, Zeilen: 34 f.
Thus even in the case of identical firms and complete certainty, there is a diffusion of innovation over time. Thus even in the case of identical firms and complete certainty, there is a "diffusion" of innovation over time.
Anmerkungen

The source is given on the previous page. No quotation marks are used.

Sichter
(SleepyHollow02) Schumann


[2.] Svr/Fragment 104 03 - Diskussion
Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2020-05-30 21:28:53 [[Benutzer:|]]
BauernOpfer, Fragment, Gesichtet, Quirmbach 1986, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop, Svr

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Untersuchte Arbeit:
Seite: 104, Zeilen: 3-6, 8-11, 13-18, 21-27
Quelle: Quirmbach 1986
Seite(n): 33, 34, Zeilen: 33: abstract, 21 ff.; 34: 9 ff., 29 ff.
Quirmbach (1986) shows that the diffusion of capital embodies process innovation results from a pattern of decreasing incremental benefits and decreasing adoption costs for later adoptions. He develops a method for comparing diffusion rates for different market structures in the capital equipment market. [...] For all market structures compared, he establishes that if the incremental benefits resulting from the kth adoption are larger under market structure A than under market structure B, then the kth adoption will occur sooner under A than under B. [...] In his studies he concludes that market power makes a difference in diffusion rates, and on which side of the market that power lies makes a considerable difference. Adapting the model of Reinganum (1981a, b) he concludes that contrary to Reinganums assumption, strategic behavior is inessential to the result of a diffusion process. Solely the patterns of incremental benefits and adoption costs are the key to the difference in diffusion rates. [...]

The explanation for the paradox between Reinganum and Quirmbachs findings is that Reinganum analyzes increases in structural concentration in the user industry while continuing to assume non-cooperative behavior of the market players, whereas Quirmbach analyzes collusive conduct of market players. Reinganum studies the increases in market share of each firm and thus the profits to a given firm’s adoption. Quirmbach (1986) criticizes that she fails to internalize the negative externalities that new adoptions visit on existing investments.


Quirmbach, H.C. 1986, “The Diffusion of New Technology and the Market for an Innovation”, Rand Journal of Economics, Vol.17, No.1, Spring 1986, pp. 33–47.

Reinganum, J. F. 1981a, “On the Diffusion of New Technology: A game Theoretic apprach [sic]”, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 48, 1981, pp. 395 – 405.

Reinganum, J. F. 1981B [sic], “Market Structure and the Diffusion of New Technology”, Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 12, Autumn, 1981, Issue 2, pp. 618 – 624.

[page 33, abstract]

This article shows that the diffusion of a capital-embodied process innovation results from a pattern of decreasing incremental benefits and adoption costs for later adoptions. Strategic behavior is inessential to this finding. We develop a method for comparing diffusion rates for different market structures in the capital equipment market. [...] Market power thus makes a difference in diffusion rates, and on which side of the market that power lies makes a considerable difference.

[...]

Adapting the model of Reinganum (1981a, 1981b), we first examine the factors that cause the diffusion of a capital-embodied, cost-reducing innovation.

[page 34]

Our results indicate that, to the contrary, strategic behavior is inessential to the result; the patterns of incremental benefits and adoption costs are the key, with or without strategic behavior.2

[...] First we establish that, for all structures compared, if the incremental benefits resulting from the kth adoption are larger under market structure A than under market structure B, then the kth adoption will occur sooner under A than under B.

[...]

In contrast, Reinganum (1981b) finds that greater concentration in the user industry increases the diffusion rate, the reverse of the buyer-side market power effect. The explanation for this paradox lies in distinguishing between structural concentration and collusive conduct. Reinganum analyzes increases in structural concentration in the user industry while continuing to assume noncooperative behavior. This increases the market share of each firm—and thus the profits to a given firm's adoption—but fails to internalize the negative externalities that new adoptions visit on existing investments.


2 Note that it is only Reinganum's interpretation and not her results themselves that are at issue.


Reinganum, J.F. “On the Diffusion of New Technology: A Game-Theoretic Approach." Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 48 (1981a). pp. 395-405.

—————, “Market Structure and the Diffusion of New Technology.” Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 12 (1981b), pp. 618-624.

Anmerkungen

The source is given, but no quotation marks are used.

Sichter
(SleepyHollow02) Schumann



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