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| Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 134, Zeilen: 1-17, 101-102 |
Quelle: Griffith 2007 Seite(n): 78, Zeilen: 2-12, 18-25, 102-104 |
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| [On behalf of the House of Commons and the Speaker it was claimed that the hiring and firing of all House] employees were ‘internal affairs’ of Parliament that were not subject to judicial review. This ‘fundamentalist’ interpretation of the exclusive cognisance doctrine was rejected by the Supreme Court, for which Binnie J wrote the unanimous judgment. Applying the ‘test of necessity’ it was held that exclusive and unreviewable jurisdiction over all House employees was not necessary to protect the functioning of the House of Commons. The attachment of privilege to ‘some’ parliamentary employees was undoubtedly necessary, but not those who were only indirectly connected to the legislative and deliberative functions of the House.401 This was the case in respect to the Speaker’s chauffeur.
This followed Binnie J’s formulation of the test of necessity in these terms: In order to sustain a claim of parliamentary privilege, the assembly or member seeking its immunity must show that the sphere of activity for which privilege is claimed is so closely and directly connected with the fulfilment by the assembly or its members of their functions as a legislative and deliberative body, including the assembly’s work in holding the government to account, that outside interference would undermine the level of autonomy required to enable the assembly and its members to do their work with dignity and efficiency.402 401 [2005] SCR 667, at para. 75. 402 [2005] SCR 667, at para. 46. |
On behalf of the House of Commons and the Speaker it was claimed that the hiring and firing of all House employees were ‘internal affairs’ of Parliament that were not subject to judicial review. This ‘fundamentalist’ interpretation of the exclusive cognisance doctrine was rejected by the Supreme Court, for which Binnie J wrote the unanimous judgment. Applying the ‘test of necessity’ it was held that exclusive and unreviewable jurisdiction over all House employees was not necessary to protect the functioning of the House of Commons. The attachment of privilege to ‘some’ parliamentary employees was undoubtedly necessary, but not those who were only indirectly connected to the legislative and deliberative functions of the House.296 This was the case in respect to the Speaker’s chauffeur.
[...] This followed Binnie J’s formulation of the test of necessity in these terms: In order to sustain a claim of parliamentary privilege, the assembly or member seeking its immunity must show that the sphere of activity for which privilege is claimed is so closely and directly connected with the fulfillment by the assembly or its members of their functions as a legislative and deliberative body, including the assembly’s work in holding the government to account, that outside interference would undermine the level of autonomy required to enable the assembly and its members to do their work with dignity and efficiency.298 296 [2005] SCR 667 at para 75. 298 [2005] SCR 667 at para 46. For a commentary on the case see - S Joyal, n 188. |
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